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Firm Heterogeneity, Informal Wage and Good Governance
*
 
We provide an analysis of enforcement policies applicable to formal sector in dual labor 
markets. We use a framework with heterogeneous firms, endogenous determination of 
informal wage and politically dictated enforcement strategies. Firms which operate both in the 
formal and informal sectors do very little to increase employment when faced with the 
opportunity of hiring workers in the informal labor market. Thus enforcement of labor laws 
and other regulations should not have aggregate employment effects, particularly when 
workers are productively homogeneous. For firms operating exclusively in the informal 
sector, the outcome is different. Such features determine the stringency of enforcement in a 
market characterized by firms with varying levels of productivity. For example, in case of 
firms with relatively high levels of productivity, enforcement has to be stricter than in the case 





The paper describes the process of employment generation in the formal and informal 
segments of a typical industry. Firms face higher cost of hiring formal workers relative to 
informal workers. Given the heterogeneity of firms in terms of productivities, enforcement of 
minimum wage law is bound to have different employment effects across various firms.  One 
major result is that firms which operate in the formal as well as in the informal sector, do not 
contribute to total employment when faced with a lower informal wage. Those exclusively 
engaged in the informal sector respond appropriately as the informal wage changes. This 
provides the foundation to a policy which suggests that more stringent enforcement of labor 
laws with respect to more productive, bigger firms is a politically sustainable policy in a 
developing economy. Since developed countries have a greater share of firms engaged in 
the formal sector, it is logical for them to strongly enforce minimum wage law. Thus, our 
paper provides a theoretical analysis of the limits of enforcement. 
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  Informal or unorganized labor markets absorb most of the workforce in the 
developing world.  While workers employed in organized, i.e., the formal segment of the 
labor market are expected to enjoy trade union rights, stake claims on government 
mandated minimum wage and other benefits, informal workers typically are excluded 
from its purview.  Consequently, unorganized workers are exposed to day-to-day 
fluctuations in wages and other conditions in the informal labor market.  A simple and 
generally acceptable characterization of such segmented markets is the difference in 
wage rates.  Formal sector workers normally enjoy higher wages than their informal 
counterpart.  
   Recent literature on informal labor market has focused on the impact of liberal 
economic policies on informal wage and employment. Marjit (2003), Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2003), Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) etc. have discussed the impact of trade 
policies on the size of the informal sector. In a different context Dasgupta and Marjit 
(2006), Marjit, Mukherjee and Kolmar (2006) have analyzed the political reasons to 
promote and perpetuate the existence of “informal” labor market even if such markets 
undermine the legal jurisdictions. The government in a poor country can choose to 
overlook irregularities in the ‘informal’ sector because it provides “social security” for 
the poor and prevents political unrest. These views hold under the presumption that 
having an informal, i.e. a low wage sector, helps both open unemployment and poverty.  
In this connection, Kanbur (2009) elegantly summarizes the issue on enforcement of 
regulations in informal labor markets.  In particular, emphasis is given on how the state 
decides on the limits of enforcement. This paper draws  on these observations and 
  2provides a formal model of enforcement.  Recent studies by Benjamin and Mbaye (2010), 
Estrin and Mickiewicz (2010), etc. elaborate the extent of compliance with regulations in 
different countries.  The common evidence in these analyses is the substantial lack of 
enforcement. 
  The purpose of this paper is to show, with the help of a simple framework, that 
existence of informal sector may not necessarily increase aggregate employment relative 
to a situation when there is no such sector.  In other words, a change in the informal wage 
may not affect aggregate employment when firms employ both formal and informal 
workers.  Employment effects of changes in informal wage will depend critically on the 
distribution of firms along the productivity spectrum.  Degree of heterogeneity of firms 
matters in determining the aggregate effects on employment.
1  Particularly, from a 
political economy angle, our analysis has some new insights to offer.  Since more 
productive firms will not increase their total demand for labor if an opportunity to access 
informal labor market presents itself, political authorities in a democracy should be more 
concerned with enforcement of regulations in markets where formal firms have large 
presence. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we develop the model and discuss 
the employment effects.  The third section looks at the determination of informal wage. 




                                                 
1 Firm heterogeneity has played a key role in contemporary trade theory.  For an elegant survey refer to 
Helpman (2006). 
 
  32.   Equilibrium in Segmented Labor Market  
  Consider an economy with firms having a choice of hiring two kinds of workers; 
formal and informal, at predetermined wage rates   > ,   being the wage paid to the 
formal (denoted with subscript 1) workers and   to the informal (denoted with subscript 
2) workers.  Labor (L) is homogeneous and difference in wage rates is the only guiding 
factor differentiating the formal and informal sectors.  Labor productivity is measured in 
terms of exogenous efficiency units.  The rule of law suggests that the firms hiring from 
the formal labor market are legally bound to pay   to each and are liable to be punished 
in case of violations.   should be interpreted as wages plus benefits i.e. the effective 
hiring cost of labor in the formal market.





Firms are distributed in a continuum of formality (degree of adherence to legal 
mandates) indexed by Z ,  .  Production functions are given by  [ 1 , 0 ∈ Z ]
)    ( ) ( i L f Z F θ = , i=1, 2                                                  (1) 
With  0 ) ( > ′ Z θ , θ θ = ) 0 ( ,  θ θ = ) 1 ( .   0 > ′ f , 0 < ′ ′ f , and  0 ) 0 ( = f .   
Thus, firms higher up in the ladder are more productive, i.e, greater compliance with 
labor regulations make formal firms more productive. If firms hire workers on informal 
basis, it will be deemed as extra legal activity compared to a purely legal employment 
regime.  If audited and apprehended, such firms will have to pay a fine S.  Formal sector 
firms that hire on the basis of extra-legal or informal contracts and pay  2 w re liable to be   a
                                                 
2   will be held fixed in the major part of the analysis while   will be eventually determined with the 
system.  Later, we provide an outline of a method to endogenize  as well.  We do not prove that a rise 
in  leads to a rise in .  Instead, we show that a lower hiring and firing costs reflected in a decline 
in  will increase .  However, labor market reforms and its impact on informal wage with capital 
mobility yields opposite results (see, Marjit, Kar and Maity, 2009).   
1 w 2 w
1 w
1 w 2 w
1 w 2 w
  4punished if apprehended. The probability of audit is q(0<q<1) and the penalty function S 
has the following characterization: 
  S = S  ,    ) ( 2 L , 0 > ′ S 0 > ′ ′ S      (2) 
The penalty function is increasing in the number of informal employments made.   
However, it can be easily substituted by a constant penalty and convex audit probability q 
with respect to the size of informal employment.  The point is, in the presence of q and S 
bigger firms find it increasingly difficult to implement informal hiring practices.    
One can even interpret S as perceived penalty due to loss of reputation if violation 
of labor laws by the firm is exposed in the media, for example.  Therefore, S is essentially 
a loss function, however interpreted.
3  If total employment of 
th Z  firm is given by L, it 
can be distributed between   and  .   Hence, the profit function of the  1 L 2 L
th Z  firm is 
given by 















    imply 
1 1) ( ) ( w L f Z = ′ θ                                                                                          (4) 
) ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 L S q w L f Z ′ + = ′ θ                                                                         (5) 
For determining optimal  equate marginal productivities of   and  in (4-5):  2 1,L L 1 L 2 L
                                                                             (6)  ) ( 2 2 1 L S q w w ′ + =
Let  2
~
L  solve (6) as the optimal informal labor contract chosen by the firm.   
Or,  =  2
~
L ) , , ( 2 1 q w w φ                                                                                 (7) 
                                                 
3 For related discussion refer to Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) which explicitly relates S to a Nash-
Bargaining problem involving bribes and generates similar marginal cost of hiring informal workers. 
  5(7) implies that for L >  hiring informal workers will be more expensive at the margin. 




L > , then  will 









Now, from (4) we can directly write  
                      ) ), ( ( 1 1 w Z L θ φ =                                                               (8) 






 as  0 > ′ θ  and  0 < ′ ′ f .   
Let there be a (interior) threshold productivity Z
~ such that  




1 1 w Z L θ φ =
Z
~ is the threshold productivity above which all firms hire formal workers along with 
informal workers.  Those below the threshold, hire only in the informal sector. 
From (8) and (9) following are immediate. 
Note that, Z Z
~
> ∀ , [ ] 2 1
~













> ∀  
Therefore,  1 2 2 ) ( w L S q w > ′ +                  (QED) 
In other words, for higher productivity firms the cost of hiring in the informal market 
exceeds the wage cost of formal employment.   
Also,  Z Z
~
≤ ∀ , firms will not operate in the formal sector. 
Since, Z Z
~
≤ ∀ ,    1 2 2 ) ( w L S q w < ′ +
This implies that firms with loose adherence to labor laws find informal employment 
profitable.   
  6  So far, we have been silent on the distribution of firms.  Let us now assume that 
) (Z η  represents the density function with    ∫ =
1
0
1 ) ( dZ Z η







dZ Z L LE η + +     (10)                         ∫ −
1
~




dZ Z L Z L η ∫
Z
dZ Z Z L
~
0
2 ) ( ) ( η




( Z Z ≥
( ) Z Z
~
≤  hire only informal workers.  Rauch (1991) gets similar 
separation results on a different model with varying firm sizes.   
  One interesting implication of the equilibrium generated in the above framework 
is as follows.  Consider a change in  and the allocation problem of those firms that 
continue to employ workers from the formal as well as informal sectors.  For those firms, 
the total number of workers they hire will not change.  This follows directly from (8), 
i.e., 
2 w
) ), ( ( 1 1 w Z L θ φ = , which is independent of  .  Note that, those firms which move in 
and out of the formal segment, employment gets affected by changes in 2 w owever, for 
firms whose productivity is beyond the cut-off point, a change inw only changes the 





  7 
where,   Informal employment in a firm operating only in the informal sector  − 2 OL
− − 2 1
~
) ( L Z L  Formal employment in a firm operating in both formal and informal sector. 




3.   Determination of Informal Wage 
  Suppose aggregate labor force is given byL . People look for jobs in the informal 
sector if they do not find one in the formal sector, with . 2 1 w w >
3 Therefore, effective 
supply of labor in the informal sector is given by  
1 2 L L L
S − =                                                                           (11) 
Recall, that Z
~ is defined by 
                                                 
3   is assumed to be given through negotiations with the trade unions, a feature of the organized labor 
market. Endogenous   must be lower than , otherwise everyone will go for informal job. While there 
is no explicit mechanism by which   adjusts under such circumstances, we assume away such 
possibilities for focusing on our main interest. In the literature Agenor and Montiel (1996), Marjit (2003) 
and others have worked with such models. One can explicitly solve for   by constructing the union’s 
objective function to ensure   >  . One may also refer to Carruth and Oswald (1984) in this context. 
The appendix provides a sketch of a proof of how   can be endogenized. 
1 w
2 w 1 w
1 w
1 w
1 w 2 w
1 w
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η                                                      (14) 
If the informal wage goes up, firms switch to formal employment and more firms initially 
hiring only informal workers start hiring from both formal and informal labor markets. 
Thus, total employment in the formal sector goes up. The residual number of jobseekers 
in the formal sector goes down. In other words, the labor supply function has a negative 
relation with .  2 w
Let  2
~ w  be defined such that  
2 2 2 2
~
) ~ ( L w L L = =                                                                         (15) 
0 1 = L  
Hence for 2 2
~ w w ≤ ,    0 1 = L
In this case  L L
S = 2  
Suppose   then all firms will hire formal workers and formal sector employment 
will hit the maximum level say
1 2 w w ≥
1 L . 
We assume  
  9                 1 L L >                                                                          (16) 
(17) suggest that even the maximum level of formal sector employment will not be able 
to exhaust labor supply.   accounts for   in Figure 2.   
S L2 4 3 2 1 S S S S
 
 
Aggregate demand for informal labor will decline as   moves up. Let us denote the 
aggregate demand as  . Note that,  =0 for  . 
2 w
D L2
D L2 1 2 w w ≥
This is obvious from (6). It is also straightforward to argue that   will continue to 
increase with decline in  . Let the following be true.  
D L2
2 w
  L w L
D
w >
→ ) ( lim 2 2 0 2
                                                              (17) 
(17) guarantees that for a low enough  aggregate informal employment can exhaust the 
entire supply of labor. This will ensure a positive equilibrium .  
2 w
2 w
Given the nature of demand and supply function, we can infer the following.  Let be 
the equilibrium wage.  
∗
2 w
  10Proposition 1:   Two possible equilibria will emerge either:  2
*
2 1
~ w w w > >   
   o r   2 2
~ w w ≤
∗ . 
 





∗) ( 2 2 . Also  . Given continuity of  ,   such that 
.  It is also shown that the equilibrium wage   has to be less than .  But   
cannot be less than
) ( ) ( 2 2 1 2 2
∗ ∗ ≤ ≥ w L w w L
S D D L2
∗ ∃ 2 w
S D L L 2 2 =
∗




~ w .             (QED) 






2 w  
 
As Figure 3 suggests both A and B are stable equilibrium.  From the definition of  , at 
point A there will be some employment in the formal sector. At B, there will be no formal 
sector employment. Also note that both A and B are Walrasian-stable equilibria. As 





~ w  
L
2 D  
S  
B
1 D  
Figure 3 
  11worse firms operating only in the informal sector. As better firms increase demand for 
labor, they retrench formal workers who then join the informal sector. So, the net 
employment effect for the formal firms is zero. The residual left is the increase in demand 
by the informal firms.  So responds to a greater extent than does . Thus, the excess 
demand increases with a drop in  and stability is 
2 D 2 S
2 w guaranteed. Finally when   is 
endogenous, a rise in   must raise   (see Appendix 1) cutting back the increase in 
employment in the formal sector.  In effect, it raises the supply   more than in the case 
with exogenous  .   
1 w
2 w 1 w
2 L
1 w
Similarly, demand for   falls further as   also increases following a rise in . 
Both these effects will reduce   relative to   when   is endogenous. Such 
endogeneity introduces flexibility in , hurting the informal workers. 
2 L 1 w 2 w
2 w
∗
2 w 1 w
1 w
 
4.   Policy Issues  
  In this section we are going to discuss two specific policies: one often discussed 
in the public forum and other never discussed in public perhaps owing to profound 
political implications it carries.  
a. Labor Market Reform  
If hiring and firing is costly or if exiting from an industry is difficult, it may hurt 
employment in the formal sector. These rigidities justify labor market reform policies 
prescribed for the developing countries.  However, such policies are undertaken with 
respect to the formal sector only and apply to a meager share of total employment in most 
developing countries.  If one reduces effective wage cost in the formal sector, it will have 
some impact on the informal wage, an indicator of the purchasing power of millions of 
  12poor people working outside formal labor contracts. In the set up developed so far, 
changes in will affect both demand and supply in the informal sector.   1 w
Consider an initial equilibrium  . To show what happens to   subsequent to a change 
in  we need to check the impact on  (labor demand) relative to  (labor supply) for 
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η η                                                   (19) 
If   goes up, formal sector employment shrinks leading to a rise in informal labor 





Now,  ∫∫ + =
Z
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S D L L ED 2 2 2 − ≡
 
Proposition 2:   Since informal labor market is Walrasian stable, labor market  
      reform will improve informal wage.  
 
Proof:  A decline in hiring and firing cost of the organized sector labor i.e.  will 








 [from (21)] 







Hence   must rise.           (QED)   
∗
2 w
Figure 4 below discusses these effects graphically with an example of four 
different types of firms with varying employment practices.  As 1 w  drops to , at a 
given , type IV firms undergo a net increase in employment from , 
although the extent of formal employment for them now is  much higher than .  
For type I firms, however, nothing changes and they continue with  level of 
employment.  For those at the margin, such as firm type III, a net increase in employment 
of  is visible.  Similarly, for type II firms, who move into the formal segment a net 
0
1 w
2 w 8 7 OA OA →
8 2A A 7 4A A
1 OA
6 5A A
  14increase in demand of   takes place.  The pressure of such excess demand 







The intuition behind the result is as follows.  If goes down because hiring and firing 
costs decline, the existing set of firms which operate both in the formal and the informal 
sectors must increase total employment creating greater demand for labor at the 
aggregate.  Those who continue to operate only in the informal sector do not alter their 
demand at a given as  does not affect them in any way.  Those who switch from 
informal to formal substitute informal workers by formal workers, but hire more than 
before as  goes down.  All these effects lead to a net increase in demand for workers in 
the informal segment and raise .    
1 w





  15b.   The Political Economy of Informal Sector  
  As we have already discussed the informal labor market provides employment to 
a vast pool of workers who do not find jobs in the so called organized formal sector. In 
many ways this acts as a cushion for poor people in the developing countries. But the 
activities which employ informal workers tend to be outside the domain of legal 
boundary. These transactions are often unrecorded, unregistered and overall extra legal.  
If the state has to preserve the sanctity of legal institutions and rules of law, strictly 
speaking, it becomes difficult to ignore informality completely and wish away extra legal 
activities. On the other hand, poor countries have to care for employment and income 
earning capacity of the huge unskilled population.  
  In our framework, q represents an index of the monitoring intensity or stringency 
of the legal structure in place. Higher  affects informal wage by restricting demand. If 
the government cares about aggregate employment as well as the importance of the legal 
institution, one may propose the following object function of the state. 
q
                                                                       (22)  ) ( ) , ( q C E q − Ω = Ω
With        , 0 1 > Ω , 0 2 > Ω , 0 11 < Ω 0 22 < Ω ,  0 21 12 = Ω = Ω ,  0 > ′ C ,  0 > ′ ′ C  
where  denotes cost of preserving law or rules of law and regulatory framework.  ) (q C
In this framework we are assuming that both  and are given and we take 
employment as the welfare indicator.  However, one could easily substitute E by a 
measure of average wage in a framework where informal labor market clears as in the 
case of labor market reforms.  Such an average wage, given a fixed   will depend on 
, the informal wage.  Thus we could have worked with instead of E and since it is 
nothing but demand for total employment at a given ( , ), a rise in E will imply a rise 
1 w 2 w
1 w
2 w 2 w
1 w 2 w
  16in when is a variable.           2 w 2 w
  Note that the objective of the government is related to those one used in Marjit, 
Kolmar and Mukherjee (2006). But in the latter the explicit role and working of the 
informal labor market was not introduced. In Marcouiller and Young (1995) a Leviathan 
State allowed informal activities or corruption to sustain itself for material gains. But ours 
is drawn from a more welfarist perspective.  
Aggregate employment E is defined as  
∫∫ ∫ − + + ≡
Z
ZZ







2 1 2 2 ) ( )
~
) ( ( ) (
~
) ( ) ( η η η  
                                      (23)  ∫∫ + =
Z
Z





1 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( η η
One way to classify societies is to do it according to the distribution of firms. 
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                                                                                                                    (24)                                     
As discussed earlier [from (4)] q does not affect  . The only term that is relevant is 
given by 














η                                                       (25) 
With  0





From (25) let us define an implicit function 
0 ), ( < ′ = E q E E                                                                                             (26) 
  17Therefore from (21) and (25) we get  
) ( )) ( , ( q C q E q − Ω = Ω                                                                                    (27) 






               E C ′ Ω − ′ = Ω ⇒ 2 1                                                                             (28) 
Note that the LHS represents the marginal benefit from upholding the sanctity of legal 
institutions, rules of law, punishing the illegal and extra legal etc. Right hand side 
represents the direct cost of monitoring and the indirect cost in terms of a reduction in 
employment in the informal sector.  
 Let  solve (28).
∗ q
4 Economies may be classified in terms of quality of firms those 
operate in the economy. Think of a situation where all firms operate in the formal sector 
with  and  Z Z Z
~
0 ) ( < ∀ = η 0 ) ( > Z η for  Z Z
~
≥ . We know that  0 = ′ E in that situation. This 
will imply a higher  compared to where there are firms operating only in the informal 
sector. Since more productive firms do not change their level of employment following 
changes in , they just substitute informal by formal, the government should not have the 
incentive to protect the extra legal sector because the marginal cost of implementing 
higher levels of q is relatively low, on the other hand for firms who are operating only in 
the informal sector, this is an additional cost. It lowers the level of employment.  
∗ q
q
Firms which operate in formal as well as in the informal sector tend to substitute one type 
of employment with the other. If qgoes up, they will substitute informal employment 
with formal employment and that helps good governance. It discourages informal 
activities without much of an impact on aggregate employment. Thus, if either through a 
                                                 
4 SOC is satisfied provided  E E C ′ ′ Ω > ′ ′ Ω + ′ ′ − Ω 2 2 11  
  18growth in labor productivity or through any set of factors that shift the labor demand 
curve upward, the need for pampering informal sector gradually declines. It follows that 
since the employment effect of bad governance is not so significant developed countries 
do not need to be protective about the informal segment.  
 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
  The paper describes the process of employment generation in the formal and 
informal segments of a typical industry. Firms face higher cost of hiring formal workers 
relative to informal workers. Given the heterogeneity of firms in terms of productivities, 
enforcement of minimum wage law is bound to have different employment effects across 
various firms.  One major result is that firms which operate in the formal as well as in the 
informal sector, do not contribute to total employment when faced with a lower informal 
wage. Those exclusively engaged in the informal sector respond appropriately as the 
informal wage changes. This provides the foundation to a policy which suggests that 
more stringent enforcement of labor laws with respect to more productive, bigger firms is 
a politically sustainable policy in a developing economy. Since developed countries have 
a greater share of firms engaged in the formal sector, it is logical for them to strongly 
enforce minimum wage law. Thus, our paper provides a theoretical analysis of the limits 
of enforcement. 
Two issues must be reflected upon.  First, throughout the entire analysis we have 
assumed that workers are homogeneous but firms are heterogeneous.  If we had two sets 
of workers, one more productive than the other, and to start with high-types match with 
formal while the low-types match with informal firms, perfect substitution would not be 
  19possible if formal or informal wages changed.  The same possibility arises if formal 
workers are given incentive compatible contracts leading to higher formal productivity of 
labor compared to informal workers as in Mookherjee and Esfahani (1995).  In this paper, 
we are interested in analyzing the case where workers are potentially identical and effort 
is insensitive to wages.  However, if informal workers are less productive than the formal 
workers, an increase in the degree of enforcement will reduce employment for firms in 
the formal as well as in the informal sector.  Consequently, the government should be 
concerned with minimizing the loss in employment due to a rise in the degree of 
enforcement.  Appendix 2 provides a short discussion on comparing the employment 
effects in formal and informal sectors subject to enforcement when informal workers are 
less productive than the formal workers.   
If the distribution of firms is heavily loaded in favor of the informal sector or that 
the productivity difference is not substantial, employment loss will be much higher in the 
informal segment.  As argued in the homogeneous case, the political strategy continues to 
be one where the government is lenient to the informal segment but strict to the formal 
sector.  At a theoretical level we could endogenize informal wage and argue why 
informal labor market will be inherently Walrasian Stable even if labor supply responds 
negatively to informal wage. Such apparatus is potentially amenable to many 
comparative static results.  Further extensions may bring in skill differentials among 
workers, explicit introduction of capital market, uncertainty in terms of labor productivity 
or state of the economy facing firms and open unemployment.   
 
 
  20Appendix 1 
Determination of   (theoretical variations of this wage determination is also available in 
Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay, 2009)  
1 w
The trade union maximizes the sum of income (u) from formal sector and also the income 
the union members receive as informal workers when they do not find a job in the formal 
sector. 
Therefore, 
) ( 1 2 1 1 L L w L w u − + = λ                                                                           (1A) 
Whereλ is the fraction of L  determining the size of the union. 


































ε  and for a meaningful  1 , 1 > ε w  
Thus    2 1 w w >
Therefore, ) ( 2 1 w w φ = ,  0 > ′ φ                                                          (2B) 
 
We have already derived in the text that  
 
) ( 1 2 w w φ = , 0 < ′ φ                                                                            (2C) 
 
Analytically one can solve for (2B) and (2C) to get   as equilibrium values.  ) , ( 2 1





  21Appendix 2 
If one informal worker is an α - fraction less productive than the formal sector, then a rise in 
q has the following net aggregate effect on employment in the formal sector (under 
reasonable mathematical properties). 









A α      ( 3 A )  










The case that is discussed here hold for 1 = α .  However, when 1 < α ,  B can easily 
dominate A and the same policy generates asymmetric implications in this dual labor 
market. The value of α close to 1 orZ
~
close to 1 will induce the government to enact 
more stringent policy for the formal sector to minimize employment loss.  Yet, the fact 
that for 1 = α  there is zero employment effect in the formal sector continues to be a 
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